The Risk of the U.S. Economy No One Is Talking About
If the Fed cuts rates in September, history suggests it will likely confirm the beginning of an easing cycle that coincides with rising unemployment. Every sustained easing cycle of the past half century has followed, not prevented, economic deterioration. This time, the risks stretch across every layer of the credit system, leaving households, banks, pensions, and governments exposed.
Corporate bonds are the first fault line. High yield still pays north of 7% and investment grade 5–6%, but spreads are near historic lows, leaving little buffer against defaults already climbing above 4%. Companies that borrowed cheaply in the 2010s now face refinancing at double or triple those rates. Lower Fed Funds won’t solve the problem: weaker earnings and a slowing economy will pressure debt service further. Banks and insurers that hold leveraged loans and corporate bonds will face both rising defaults and declining recovery values.
Municipalities look safer on paper, but the cracks are clear. Cities and towns rely on property tax backed bonds to fund schools, roads, and infrastructure. If the Fed is cutting because growth and employment are weakening, property values and tax receipts will follow. Debt service, however, is fixed. That leaves local governments forced to raise taxes on a shrinking base or cut essential services. The burden ultimately falls on taxpayers and public sector workers, while muni bondholders expect to be paid in full.
Pensions sit directly in the middle. Decades of low yields forced them into private equity, real estate, and high yield credit. These illiquid assets can mask valuation declines until a downturn forces recognition. Meanwhile, pensions are structurally cash flow negative: more going out to retirees than coming in from workers. As unemployment rises, contributions shrink further, forcing more asset sales into weak markets. Retirees, municipal governments, and ultimately taxpayers are exposed when funding gaps widen.
At the top of the system lies the federal government. Between now and 2026, $12–14 trillion of debt must be refinanced. Much of it was issued when rates were near 1.5%; it now rolls at 4–5%. Even with Fed cuts, Treasury issuance remains enormous, crowding out demand for risk assets. Interest costs are on track to exceed $1 trillion annually, straining fiscal capacity. Holders of Treasuries like banks, pensions, foreign governments are exposed to both mark to market losses and the risk of crowd out that pressures every other borrower.
Finally, households, the ground floor of the credit system are already flashing red. Serious credit card delinquencies are near financial crisis levels. Auto loan delinquencies, especially in subprime, have surpassed them. Student loan delinquencies are climbing fast since the payment pause ended. And commercial office space delinquencies have already broken through 2008 peaks. The exposure here runs wide: banks that originated the loans, ABS investors holding securitizations, landlords reliant on office income, and pensions that own slices of all of it.
Each of these risks alone would be manageable. What makes this moment different is how tightly interlocked they are. Households under pressure shrink tax bases for cities. Corporate and CRE stress flows straight to bank balance sheets. Pensions are exposed to all of it, just as the Treasury’s refinancing wall towers over the rest. And if history holds, a Fed easing cycle means unemployment will climb, magnifying every one of these pressures.
This isn’t just one sector at risk. It’s the entire credit ecosystem of households, cities, pensions, banks, and the federal government leveraged against itself. And almost no one is talking about it.